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NOTES.
LAW SCHiOOL-TIlE NEW ACADEMIC YEAR-With the opening
of this academic year, the Law School enters a new epoch in its
existence. This year for the first time the new entrance requirements which were approved by the' Board of Trustees in Aprl
1914, go into effect, and every candidate for.admission to the Law
School must have a college degree. We have no doubt that these

requirements will prove beneficial to the Law School.

Though

doubtless for some years to come the classes will be smaller than

they have been heretofore, they will have a greater fundamental

knowledge and their progress will be more speedy. Similar requirements have been successful wherever they have been adopted.
(893)
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We are happy to welcome the one new member of the Faculty,
Edwin Roulette Keedy, Esq., who becomes Professor of Law. Professor Keedy was born at Boonesboro, Maryland, in i88o. His preliminary education was received in the public schools at Hagerstown,
Maryland. He graduated from Franklin and Marshall College in
1899 and from the Harvard Law School in 19o6. He was a member of the Law Faculty of Indiana University from i9o6 to 19o9.
He was a Professor of Law in Northwestern University from i909
to 19r5. He was First Secretary of the American Institute of
Criminal Law and Criminology from i9o9 to i9io, and a member
of the Commission of this Institute to investigate the administration of the criminal law in England, in i9io. In 1912 he investigated the administration of the criminal law in Scotland under the
auspices of President Taft and Attorney-General Wickersham. In
addition to Professor Keedy, Dr. Lewis returns to the Faculty from
his year's leave of absence. Mr. Baker has resigned from the
Faculty- and will devote his whole time to active practice.
Several changes have been made this year in the curriculum.
In the First Year Class, Dean Mikell will give a series of lectures
on "Elementary Law"; the purpose of these lectures is to explain
to the beginner the intrinsic nature of the law and the interrelation of its various branches. Professor Reedy will conduct the
first year course. on Associations in place of Mr. Schnader. In the
Second Year Class, Dr. Lewis returns to take up his course on
Partnership, and in addition -will conduct the course on Trusts in
Mr. Baker's place. Professor Keedy will teach Bills and Notes,
and Mr. Loyd Equity. In the Third Year Class, Dr. Lewis will
again teach Corporations, and Professor Keedy will conduct Criminal Procedure, Equity Pleading and Practice, and Public Service
Corporations. Mr. Loyd will conduct a new course on Mortgages.
In other respects the courses will be the same as they were last year.
We are gratified to announce that two new prizes have been
established. Former students and friends of the late Professor
Peter McCall have established in his memory a prize to be known as
the Peter McCall Prize. This prize, amounting to eighty dollars,
will be awarded each year to the member of the graduating class
receiving the highest grades during the three years he attended the
Law School. The American Law Book Company has placed at the
disposal of the Faculty of the Law School of the* University of
Pennsylvania a set .of "Cyc" with its annual annotations to date, to
be given as a prize to the student who receives the highest honor in
scholarship for the period of his senior year; with the further offer
of three "Corpus Juris" scholarships of five hundred dollars each.
In conclusion, we feel that now as never before the Law School
can look forward to a year of prosperity, and the LAW REVIEW
heartily extends its best wishes of success.
•E. W.'Ml.
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LAW Sc1IoOL-D.-TIi OF Jonx LiSLE-On June 2ot last, John
Lisle, Esq., a graduate of the Law School, lost his life at Chelsea,
New Jersey, in an effort to save another from drowning. Mr. Lisle
had, since his graduation from the I.aw Department in i9io, not
only practised actively and with growing success, but had written
on legal subjects and done some excellent translation of legal works
in other languages. Mr. Lisle had been requested to deliver a course
of lectures this autumn in the Auxiliary Course of the Law School.
His pleasant and courteous manner, his sterling character, and the
great promise which he gave as a lawyer and writer, make his loss
one which the Alumni of the School and its Faculty feel most deeply.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEREGATION ORDINANcE-The efforts
of municipalities to prevent conflict and ill-feeling between the white
and colored races, by legislation providing for residential restrictions
on either or both races, has not always met - ith the approval of
State courts of last resort. The Baltimore, \V\nston and Atlanta
ordinances' all were held unconstitutional,, but the race segregation
ordinance of the city of Louisville has triumphed.2 By imposing
identical restrictions as to the alienation of property in white or
black blocks, by excepting buildings occupied prior to the adoption
of the ordinance, the pi tfalls of constitutional prohibition were
avoided. So far as we have been able'to learn, municipal segregation ordinances have been passed upon by the appellate courts of
but four States.
The municipal segregation ordinance enacted by the City Council of Baltimore and passed Upon by the Maryland Court of Appeals
in State v. Gurr3,3 simply prohibited a white person from moving
into a block inhabited solely by colored persons and prohibited
colored persons from movir.g into a block inhabited solely by whites.
Unlike the Louisville ordinance, it contained no reservation in protection of vested rights existing at the time of the enactment of the
ordinance. The Louisville ordinance provided that "Nothing herein
contained shall be construed to prevent any person who, at the date
of the passage of this ordinance, shall have acquired, or possessed
the right to occupy any building as a residence, place of abode, or
place of assembly from exercising such right." Upon a consideration
of the ordinance enacted in Baltimore, the Maryland court held
that the attempted exercise of the police power was of such char-

'State v. Gurry,

121

lid. 534 (1913); State v. Darnell, 166 N. C. 300

(1914); Carey v. City of Atlanta, 84 S. E. Rep. 456 (Ga. i915).
' Harris v. City of Louisville, 177 S. W. Rep. 472 (Ky. 1915).

3State v. Gurry,

121

Md. 534

(1913).
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acter as to preclude the court from assuming that the legislature
intended to confer on the municipality the power to affect vested
rights in the manner sought by the ordint.nce.
The municipal legislature of the city of Winston, North
Carolina, adopted a segregation ordinance which was passed upon
by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in the case of State v.
Darnell.4 The ordinance, like the Baltimore ordinance, contained
no saving provision in protection of vested rights existing at the
time of the adoption of the ordinance. The opinion is notable in
that the court seems to have been impressed by the time-worn
sophistry that, if the power exist to segregate white and blacks, then
the power must likewise exist to segregate Republican and Democrat,
persons of Irish .descent and those of German descent, Protestant
and Catholic. This argument was conclusively disposed of by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Plessy v. Ferguson.5 In
delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Brown said:
"The reply to all this is -that every exercise of the police
power must Be reasonable and extend only to such laws as are
enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good and
not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class. So
far then as a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the case reduces itself to the question whether the
statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation and with respect
to this, there must necessarily be a large discretibn on the part
of the legislature. In determining the question of reasonableness,- it is at liberty to act with reference to the established
usages. customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to
the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the
public peace and good order. Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable or
more obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the Acts of
Congress requiring separate schools for colored children in the
District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does not
seem to have been questioned or the corresponding acts of
State legislatures."
The municipal legislature of Atlanta enacted a segregation
ordinance which was passed upon by the Supreme Court of Georgia
in the case of Carey v. City of Atlanta.8 This ordinance, like the
Baltimore ordinance, failed to contain any saving clause in protection
of vested rights acquired before the passage of the ordinance. The
'Note i, supra.
Plessy v. Ferguson, x63 U. S. S37 (1895).
,Note i, supra.

A7
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Georgia court hehl that the ordinance destroyed the right of the
individual to acquire, enjoy and di:pose of his property, and ,hat it
was void, as being in controvention of the due process clause of the

v
Federal Constitution. There is nothing in the Louisville ordinance
which takes away from any person th.. right to acquire property
anywhere in the city; but the ordinance does prohibit any colored
person from occupying as a residence a building in any block in
which the greater part of the houses are occupied by white persons
and vice versa; however, persons owning or occupying property at
the passage of the ordinance are in no way affecied.
If it be conceded that the right of alienation is a vested right
which cannot be taken away altogether by legislation, still such is
not the effect of the Louisville ordinance. An indirect restriction
upon the right of alienation resulting from the denial of the probability of alienation to ceitain classes of purchasers cannot be held
to be a complete destruction of the power to alienate or deprivation

of a vested right, violative of the constitutional guaraities. The
principle isusell settled that reasonable restiaints upon the use of
private property and upon the liberty to contract do not constitute a
deprivation of "life, liberty or property without due process of
law" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.'
It was argued that the ordinance violated the Fourteenth
Amendment because it prevented the residence of negroes in more
desirable portions of the city. It is hard to see, however, how this
could be construed to be a denial of the equal pirtection of the'laws.
For the enforced separatien cf the races alone is not a discrimination
or denial of the constitutional guaranty.' If such separation should
result in the members of the colored race being restricted to residence in the less desirable portions of the city, they could render
those portions more desirable through their own efforts as the white
race has done.
The public policy of different States in respect to the separation of races has long been exhibited in legislation. By lgis atiive
mandate the races have been separated upon public conveyance,
where by virtue of necessity they must otherwise have been associated;1o by legislative mandate they have been separated in the
public schools,' 1 and the laws of a number of States prohibit mar-

'Note

2, jupra.

U.Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887); Crowley v. Christensen, t,y
U. S.86 (x89o).
'Note 5, supra.
"West Chester R. Co. v. MAis, 55 Pa. 209 (x8G); LouLisville R. Co. v.
Mississippi, T33 U. S. 587 (:889); Ohio Valley L Co. v. Landcr, r04 Ky. 431
(1898) ; Morrison v. State, x16 Tenn. 53a(i9o5).
U People v. Quincy Board of .Education, io IIl. 3o8 (1882); Hoker v.
Town of Greenville, 13o N. C. 472 (i9o8) ;. Berea College v. United States,
211 U. S. 50 (1908).
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riages between white persons and negroes or persons of more than
a stated proportion of African blood.2 - In view of the fact that this
legislation is upheld partly in recoguhition of the peril to race integrity
induced by mere propinquity, we see but little difference in the prevention by law of the association of white and colored pupils in the
schools of the State and in the prevention of their living side by side
in their homes.
G.H.K.
COPYRIGHT-

INFRINGEMENT-

ABRIDGMENT OF COPYRIGHTED

Boos-The custom of "cramming" knowledge (predigested and
made palatable by tutors) into students too indolent to condense for
themselves the prescribed text-books, is widespread. Occasionally,
the practice is vigorously condemned by the scholastic authorities,
but it is unusual for the matter to meet with judicial disapproval, as
occurred in a recent case,1 in which the following interesting facts
were involved: The defendant, a tutor, gave private instructions to
students in Harvard University taking a course in economics under
a professor who had copyrighted a book, "Principles of Economics,"
which was published by the plaintiff. The defendant prepared brief
outlines of the text-book covering the subjects to be discussed at his
next meeting with the students and allowed them to keep the outlines
during the .intervals between their weekly conferences. It was
understood by the students that the outlines were to be returned at
the end of the week and were not to be used except in preparation
for the conferences. These were destroyed after they had been so
used. The defendant also prepared other outlines for use, not at a
particular conference dealing with a particular part of the book, but
for tutoring in preparation for a final examination in one of the
courses in economics. These were intended to outline all the subject
matter covered in that course during a certain term, and were given
to the students to be kept until immediately before the examination
and then returned to the defendant. In some manner, these outlines
got into the possession of the plaintiff, who thereupon brought a bill
in equity for an injunction to restrain infringement of the copyright.
The court held that both forms of outline,--which frequently quoted
from the copyrighted book words and sentences likely to catch the
attention and remain in the memory, and which treated in an abridged
and paraphrased form the topics of the book, although the author's
order and arrangement were not always followed,-were in violation
of the Copyright Act of 1909,2 which secures to the owner of a
12Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 32r (i869) ; State v. Jackson, go Mo. i75 (1873).
'MacMillan Co. v. King, 223 Fed. Rep. 862 (1914).
'Copyright Act of March 4, x9og, .Comp. St. 1913, f95I9.

NOTES

copyright in a literary work the exclusive right to "print, reprint,
publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work" 3 and "'to make any
other version thereof' '4 and which also provides that the copyright
shall protect "all the copyrightable component parts of the -work
copyrighted and all matter therein in which copyright is already"
subsisting."'
The court excellently summarized the situation as
follows:
"Though the reproduction of the author's ideas and language is incomplete and fragmentary, and frequently presents
them in a somewhat distorted form, important portions of them
are left substantially recognizable. If they had not been so left,
the defendant's evident purpose could not have been accomplished. It seems obvious that what he was trying to give and
what his pupils were trying to get, was an acquaintance with the
contents of the book, which should resemble as much as poisible
that acquaintance which they would have obtained for tlemselves by following with sufficient diligence the university course
of instruction for which the book was the appointed text-book.
Nor do I see any reason to doubt that these outlines might
readily cause the student to think he could meet the minimum
requirements without using the book itself."
In conclusion, the court held that the defendant's abridgment constituted "versions" of substantial portions of the book, such as the
plaintiff alone had the right to make.
Early English cases8 adopted as a test of infringement of copyright by abridgment the quantity of the material abstracted. Later
English7 and Americang cases, decided before the passage of the
Act of i9o9," held that a substantial condensation of the original
work did not constitute a piracy, if intellectual labor and-judgment
had been required. However, the value of the selections made and
the probable effect on the original work were also important factors
in determining whether an abridgment was an infringement.*
Some courts believed the abridgment to be a form of beneficial

*Oia.

• §ib.
0§3.
• Dodsley v. Kinnersley, Amb. 4o3 (1761).
'Hawkworth v. Newbery, Lofft. 775 (1774).
Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story, ioo (U. S. 1841) ; Lawrence v. Dana, 4 Cliff. I

(U. S. 1869).

0Supra, . Z
"Gray v. Russell,

I Story, it (U. S. 1839).
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advertisement to the author."' Others regarded the abridger
"rather as a sort of jackal to the public to point out the beauties
of authors."'12 The rccent English Copyright Act of 19it failed to
reserve to the owner of the copyright the right of abridgment."
The courts have not been frequently called upon to interpret
the American Copyright Code of 19014 so far as abridgments are
concerned. In what appears to be the only case,"' in which a question similar to that in the principal case has arisen, the court held
that if an abridgment goes no further than to "give just enough information to put the reader upon inquiry regardin& the contents of
In that case,
the copyrighted book, .there was no infringement.'
the owner of a copyrighted opera libretto of forty-six pages sought
to restrain the publication of a half page synopsis thereof in a book
called "Opera Stories." In refusing to grant an injunction, the
court said a literal definition of the words "make any other version
thereof" "might even lead to the ludicrous result of condemning
as an infringer the writer who publishes a laudatory notice of a
picture or a poem. The historian who describes the charge of the
cuirassiers at Friedland will hardly expect to be sued by the owner
of the copyright covering Meissonier's great painting---t8oT.'
The editor who reports the departure of 'the captains and the
kings' and the dispersion of the navy after a celebration will probably be astonished if accused of infringing 'The Recessional."'
Obviously, the principal case presents a much stronger argument
for an injunction and the decision therein is clearly in accordance
with the requirements of the Act of Igo97.6
A. L.L.
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AcT-WHEN IS AN EMPLOYEE

ENGAGED IN INiERSTATE COMmERE-The federal Employers' Lia-

bility Act' provides that "any common carrier shall be liable in
damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by
such carrier in interstate commerce . . . resulting in whole or
inpart from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier," thereby effectually removing the common
law fellow servant defence available before the passage of the act
in question. Consequently the question as to whether or not a par' Supra, n. 6.
"Tinsley v. Lacy, r H. and M. 47 (86x).
"Copinger on the Law of Copyright, 5th Ed. (igrS), p.

z5&

"Supra, n. z

"G. Ricordi & Co. v. Mason, 2ox Fed. Rep. i82-z85 (i9t1-i912) ; affirmed
on appeal, 210 Fed. 277 (1gr3).
"See accord: Bowker on Copyright (1912), p. 8o.
'Act of Congress of April 22, igo8, 35 U. S. Stat. 6S, c. z49."

ATOTES

ticular individual is engaged in interstate commerce becomes of the
utmost importance in every case arising in a State where the
common law doctrine is still in force or where there has been no
legislative enactment similar to the federal act.
An examination of the various decisions on this point leads to
the conclusion that the real test is this: Was the instrumentality on
which the individual was working when injured actually in use in
interstate commerce, or merely temporarily out of use for the purpose of repair. If so, such individual was engaged in interstate
commerce. The leading case is Pedersen v. Delaware,Lackananna
and Western Railroad Company,2 where the plaintiff was employed
in repairing a bridge which had been used in both interstate and
intrastate commerce. While crossing a temporary bridge used in
place of that being repaired, carrying a sack of rivets to be used in
the old bridge, he was injured. Mr. Justice Van Devanter said:
"Tracks and bridges are as indispensable to interstate commerce by railroad as are engines aid cars, and sound economic
reasons unite with settled rules of law in demanding that all
these instrumentalities be kept in repair. . . . We are of
the opinion that the work of keeping such instrumentalities in a
proper state of repair while thus used is so closely related to
such commerce as to be in practice and in legal contemplation a
part of it. . . . True a track or bridge may be used in both
interstate and intrastate commerce, but when it is so used it is
none the less an instrumentality of the former; nor does its
double use prevent the employment of those who are engaged
in its repair or in keeping it in suitable condition for use from
being an employment in interstate commerce."
If it can be proved that the instrumentality in question fulfilled
the requirements laid down in the Pedersen case the courts have
gone far in applying the doctrine of that case and in allowing recovery by the injured employee. In a recent Pennsylvania decision'
the plaintiff was injured while binding together rails used in interstate commerce with copper wire in connection with the installation
of a new automatic electric signal system. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania allowed recovery. In Lombardo v. Boston and Maine
Railroad4 where the plaintiff when injured was repairing a track in
the yards of a paper company used by the defendant in interstate
and intrastate commerce, it was held that he was engaged in intero too, where the plaintiff was returning on a
state commerce.
hand-car from his work which consisted of ballasting an interstate
track, and was injured by the negligence of a fellow employee, it
2'229 U. S. 146 (1913).

Glunt v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co.,
Fed. Rep. 427 (i915).

'223

249

Pa. -c= (igis).
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was held that he was still engaged in interstate commerce.5 And,
where a fireman was about to report for duty on an interstate train
and was struck and killed while approaching the station, through the
negligence of a fellow servant, recovery was allowed.6 And in
North Carolina Railroad Compony v. ZacharyT the Supreme Court
of the United States held that the doctrine of the Pedersen case applied where a fireman having oiled and inspected his locomotive
preparatory to an interstate trip, had left his engine and was injured
while crossing the tracks on his way to his boarding house. All
these cases serve to show that the courts will apply the federal act
in extreme instances, once it has been shown that the instrumentality in the particular case was a part of interstate commerce.
On the other hand it has been decided that unless the instrumentality in question actually was in use in interstate commerce, or
had been in use and was temporarily out of use for the purposes of
repair, that the federal act does not apply. This occurs most frequently when a new instrumentality is being constructed which is
intended for use in interstate commerce but has not been so used
when the injury complained of occurred. In Bravis v. Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Companv the plaintiff was injured
while engaged in the construction of a bridge some six hundred feet
from the railroad which was to be used in conjunction with a "cutoff." No tracks had been laid on this bridge at the time. Judge
Sanborn, of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, said:
"Those employed in the preparation or construction of roadbeds,
rails, ties, caris, engines, and other instrumentalities which are intended for use in interstate commerce, but have never been, and are
not in use therein, are not employed in interstate commerce, and are
not protected by the Act." So too, where the plaintiff when injured -,as engaged in the construction of an incompleted tunnel
which was a part of a "cut-off," no recovery was allowed because
of the fellow servant rule.9
Therefore, as stated above, it seems that the test applicable to
the question as to whether or not an individual is engaged in interstate commerce, is whether or not the individual in question was
working on an instrumentality which was actually in use in interstate commerce, or was merely out of use temporarily for the purpose of repair. If so, the federal Employers' Liability Act applies,
and otherwise it does not.
J.W.L.
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San Pedro, L A. & S. L. R. Co. v. Davide, 21o Fed. Rep. 870 (1914).
' Lamphere v. Oregon Railroad & Navigation Company, 196 Fed. Rep.
(1912).

'232 U. S. 248 (1913).
2217 Fed. Rep. 234 (1914).
'Jackson v. Chicago, Al. & St. P. Ry. Co., 21o Fed. Rep. 485 (zg14).

NOTES
EQUITY

PERFORMANCE-IUTUALITY

JURISDICTION-SPECIFIC

-The defence of "lack of mutuality" in a suit for the specific performance of a contract has given considerable trouble- to the courts
of equity and has been the subject of much discussion and considerable comment, mostly adverse, on the part of text-writers and
students of the law." In the words of the late Professor James
Barr Ames, the doctrine, briefly, is as follows: "Equity will not
compel specific performance by a defendant if after performance,
the common law remedy of damages would be his sole 2security for
the performance of the plaintiff's side of the contract."
The question has presented itself in many different aspects and
many exceptions have arisen which have come to be as well settled
as the rule itself. One of the earliest of these is that which grants
specific performance at the instance of a party not originally bound
by a contract within the Statute of Frauds because he did not'sign
the memorandum, against another who did sign, it, on the theory
that by resorting to a suit for specific performane, le party whodid not sign thereby adopts the agreement and renders it obligatory
upon himself.8
The courts are uniform in enforcing a contract made with an ,
infant if he is in court asking the chancellor to act. This proceeds.
on the same theory.4 Curiously enough, there is not such a uniformity in regard to similar contracts made with a feme covert, but
the weight of opinion is that equitable relief should be granted.'
There is a decided split as to the problem of when a 'contiact
should be examined for mutuality. Most courts hold that if at the
time of the litigation, the contract is enforceable by both parties,
relief should be granted, but there is a strong minority, s.uported
chiefly by the federal decisions, which maintain that a contract not
mutual at the outset is unenforceable specifically in equity. This

ISee the exhaustive article of Professor Wn. Draper Lewis in .4o Am.
REG. 387, 393. See also article of H. C. McClintock, Esq., in 58 Urv.
op PENNA. LAW REV. 16, and the article of the late Professor Janfes Barr
LAW

Ames, in 3 CoL LAW Rzv. 1.
* See 3 CoL LAW RE. 1L
"See the early case of Hatton v. Gray,

2

Cases in Chancery, z64 (Eng.

1684). See also Sylvester v. Barn, 132 Pa. 467 (z89o); Kroh v. Wassner, 7S
N. J. Eq. io9 (igo8); cases collected and cited in Ames' "Cases on Equity

Jurisdiction", p. 42t, n.; and cases cited in the note to Western Timber Co; v.

Kalama Lumber Co., 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 397.

' Fliglit v. Bolland, 4 Russell, M (Eng. 1828). 'See also cases cited in

Ames' Cases, p. 423, n.
' Fennelly v. Anderson, I Irish Chancery Reports, 7o6 (i85x ; Armstrong
See, contra, Gage v. Cumv. Maryland Coal Co., 67 W. Va. 591 (1o).
mings, 2o9 I11.x2o (1904), and adverse criticism and cases cited therein in
Fry: "Specific Performance" (3rd Ed.), p. 2x7.
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problem is well illustrated by those contracts which call for the sale
of land not at the time the property of the vendor, but which is subsequently acqaired by him. The majorit)y view is that want of title
at the time of the contract is no defense if the plaintiff can give title
at the time of the decree,6 but the federal courts are committed to
the opposite doctrine. The force of the leading case, however, t has
been somewhat broken by a later decision of the same court,' where
it is held that the rule denying specific performance does not apply
if the vendee is honestly informed at the time the contract is made
that the vendor does not have title to the property but has reasonable expectation of securing it before the time set for the actual

coveyance.
The problem has also arisen in cases involving contracts foi
personal services. One view is that since the party contracting to
render the services can not be compelled to perform, he likewise
should be made to seek his remedy at law, though he be in court,
ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement,9 but the
modern attitude seems to be that the question of compelling performance on the part of the plaintiff, should he refuse, should not
be anticipated and that he should be entitled to a decree."0 Of course
the doctrine of mutuality is obviously not applicable to unilateral
contracts.""
But options have given the courts the most trouble in this respect. The right to demand specific performance of a lessor's contract to renew a lease at the option of the lessee is well established,
since the courts were familiar with this sort of contract long before the doctrine of mutual'ty arose.12 Moreover, the courts invariably hold that if there is any coihsideration, however slight, for
an option to buy or sell land, specific performance should not be

'Musselman's Appeal, 65 Pa. 480 (x87o); Armstrong v. Maryland Coal
Co., supra, n. 5.
'Norris v. Fox, 45 Fed. Rep. 406 (z89z).
'Day v. Mountin, 137 Fed. Rep. 756 (19o5).
' Hills v. Croll, 2 Phillips, 6o (Eng. 1845). See also cases cited in voluminous note in Ames' Cases, p. 42&
"Singer Co. v. Buttonhole Co., Holmes, 253 (U. S. Cir. Ct. 1873) ; Butterick Pattern Co. v. Rose, 141 W~is. SM (191o).
"Howe v. Watson, 6o N. E. Rep. 4r5 (Mass. i9o1). See also Ames'
Cases, p. 43o, n.
"McCormick v. Stephany, 57 N. J. Eq. 257 (898).
For a full collection
of the numerous English and Irish decisions, see article by Professor Lewis
supra, n. i. For the American cases, which are few in number, see Ames
Cases, p. 432, ii.

NOTES

denied.1 But the contract ,vhich provides for a lease with the option in the lessee to terminate it at will or upon short-time notice, is
the rock upon which the cases split. The majority view is that such
a clause does not present an unsurmountable obstacle in the way of
a decree of specific performance and the decisions, which are numerous, are well illustrated by the so-called "base-ball cases."14 The
minority view, on the other hand. is supported by a strong line of
cases, though the jurisdictions which have adopted it are few. This
theory is that a defendant should not be compelled to make a lease
or perform a contract which he .ould not enforce, but which the
lessee or promisee, the very person who is asking the court to act,
may terminate at his desire. This principle was applied in Michigan, in a case involving a contract to lease mining lands with a
clause enabling the lessees to terminate upon thirty days' notice, 5
but this decision had such an injurious effect upon the development
of the mineral wealth of the State that the legislature in the following year gave to the holder of an option in such a lease an absolute
right to specific performance in chancery despite the clause of surrender contained therein.16 The doctrine is still enforced in Illinois,
however,' T and it has been regarded always as the rule of the federal
courts. The leading case turned upon a contract whereby one party
agreed to cut and deliver all the marble the other party could use,
the latter agreeing to take it all, but with the power to terminate the
arrangement upon a year's notice. The court refused specific performance.' Though there is ground, from the very nature of the
case, for reasonable doubt as to whether this decision is not mere
obiter dicta, and though there are apparently -no decisions in the
same court which squarely support it in all its force," it has1been
0
cited universally as announcing the rule of the federal courts.
In this connection it is interesting to note a recent decision of
the United States Supreme Court, in which this problem is discussed by M\r. Justice Van Devanter." An oil and gas lease to be
'Ross v.Parks 93 Ala. i53 (18go); O'Brien v. Boland, 166 Mass. 48z
(x896); Corbett v. Cronkhite, 239 Ill. 9 (xgog); Schaeffer v. Herman, 237 Pa.
86 (1912). See, contra, Graybill v. Bugh, 89 Va. 89s (1893), overruled in
Watkins v. Robertson, 1o5 Va. 269 (igo6). See also Ames' Cases, p. 432, n.

"See Phila. Ball Club v. Lajoie, 2o2 Pa. 210 (igo2), and cases cited.
therein by Potter, J.
"Rust v. Conrad, 47 Mich. 449 (x882).
'See Grumett v. Gingrass, 77 Mich. 369, 388 (1889).
"Ubrey v. Keith, 237 Ill. 284 (1908).
"Marble Co. v. Ripley, io Wall 339 (I876).
"The question was not squarely mei by the Court of Appeals in the recent

case of Weegham v. Killefer, 215 Fed. Rep. 168 (1914), the last "base-ball"
case of importance in the federal courts.
" See Federal Oil Co. v. Western Oil Co., 112 Fed. Rep. 373 (1ga).
" Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 1o

(1915).
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valid as long as oil and gas were found on the land gave the lessees
the option to surrender it at any time upon the payment of one
dollar, after which "all payments and liabilities -thereafter to accrue
should cease and determine." The lessor gave a subsequent lease
of the same premises to the defendant's assignors, who took with
notice of the prior lease. The complainants, assignees of the lessees
under the first lease, brought a bill in equity to enjoin operations
under the latter lease and to obtain a discoverv and an accounting
in respect of the oil and gas produced and sold in the course of
operations already had. The court decreed accordingly.
The basis upon which the decision is founded is aside from the
real problem and the court avoided the necessity of directly dealing
with the earlier federal cases on the subject. It found that such a
lease passes a "present vested right-'a freehold interest -in the
premises, taxable as real property" and the court dwelt on this fact
and upon the fact that under the laws of Illinois, in which State the
cause of action arose, the holder of such a lease may not bring an
action of ejectment thereon. The point was also made that any action at law for damages would be clearly inadequate. The court
distinguished the cases of contracts containing an option of surrender on the ground that the case in question was not d case involving
the specific performance of an executory contract to give a lease or
even the enforcement of an executory promise in a lease already
given, but rather one "to protect a present vested leasehold, amounting to a freehold interest, from the continuing and irreparable injury calculated to accomplish its practical destruction." In the
words of Mr. Justice Van Devanter, "The complaint is not that performance of some promised act is being withheld or refused, but
that the complainants' vested freehold right is being wrongfully
violated and impaired in a way which calls for preventive relief."
The court even held that "in a practical sense" the suit was one to
prevent waste.
'While the views of the learned justice are no doubt of great
weight and importance, it is submitted that the decision in effect
curtails the force of the earlier decisions on the subject, despite the
effort to distinguish the two situations. It is difficult to understand
the decree in any light other than that of a direct enforcement of
rights under such a contract, if not of the very contract itself, which
had previously been declared unenforceable repeatedly, and this is
the more apparent in the principal case in view of the fact that the
original lessor, who gave the option, was made a defendant in the
suit. Surely this is enforcing the contract as to him, negatively at
least.
But perhaps it is not too ambitious to suggest that the Supreme
Court has come to the point where it realizes that its former position is not in accord with the modern trend of authority. In this
light the case in question might well be an indication of a complete
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reversal in the future. Indeed the court admitted that the rule formerly adhered to is "restrained by many exceptions," and has been
"the subject of divergent opinions on the part of jurists and textwriters."
It is submitted that the majority view is logically sound and
practically almost a necessity, though the federal doctrine is perhaps theoretically the better. While under such a contract it might
be truthfully said that there is not true mutuality of right, there is
mutuality of remedy, in that the party holding the option is ready
and willing to perform and the question of compelling him to do so
should not be considered until it arises.
It is submitted that the court in the principal case could hardly
have been criticized had it squarely abandoned the earlier position
of the federal courts.
L.B.S.

